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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2016) calls for resources for the 
implementation of the Action Plan for Accelerated Industrial Development in Africa, and states 
that: “Industrialization is essential for African countries as a means of increasing income, 
creating jobs, developing value-added activities and diversifying economies”. The United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the African Development Bank (AFDB), and the 
Organization for Cooperation and Economics Development (OCED, 2014, p. 16) explain the 
benefits to African countries’ participation in Global Value Chains (GVC) to industrialize 
without having to implement all stages of the chain. 
They add that the acquisition of new production capacities can allow countries and companies 
to move upmarket, which is to say to increase their share of value added in a GVC. But the 
opposite is the case, at least in some countries like Burkina Faso. We are witnessing a 
“specialization of primary products (cotton and non-monetary gold), to the detriment of 
manufacturing industry with high potential for multiplier effects on local economies” National 
Plan for Economic and Social Development of Burkina Faso (PNDES, 2017, p.12). Cusolito 
and al. (2016) mention that overcoming a series of obstacles (such as bad policies and 
governance, insufficient technology and skills) is the way to actively participate in GVCs. Yet 
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it is these same obstacles that have always prevented the industrialization of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (excluding South Africa). 
The results show that the Global Value Chains (GVC) contribute to the creation of added value 
in developing countries what has an effect on industrialization.  
Keywords: Economic Paradox, Global Value Chains, Added Value, Industrialization 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
Classical economic theory, starting with the theory of absolute advantage (Smith, 1776) 
suggests that for the benefit of all, each country must devote itself to the production of goods 
for which it has an advantage compared to the other participating countries. However, Guerrero 
(1995) notes that goods are produced all over the world by capitalist enterprises which seek in 
the first term to make profits. This is why, instead of worrying about what is desirable for all, 
producers in the most efficient countries in the absolute sense of the term are ravaging other 
markets with their goods, simply because they are capable of producing them, cheaper. Gereffi 
and Fernandez-Stark (2011, p. 3) explain that: "For many countries, particularly low-income 
countries, the ability to integrate effectively into the World Value Chains is an essential 
condition for their development".  
According to INSEE (2017), the value added for a company corresponds to production less 
intermediate consumption is closely linked to GDP, which is made up of the sum of companies' 
added values plus indirect taxes and customs duties. For Dunning and Lundan (2008, p. 
607) one of the main objectives of any country is to maximize the National Added Value (NPV) 
from the use of a given quantity of resources and capacities ".  If a country wants to increase 
its NPV, it can do so by attracting foreign investment which will increase revenues 
from domestic production and subsequently its level of production and export. To encourage 
national or foreign companies to invest, it has the capacity to act on production costs "C", on 
taxes "T" or subsidies "S". It is this ability to encourage companies to invest in a country that 
Porter (1991), calls the competitive advantage. If one defines development as long-term and 
self-sustained economic growth (wealth, technology, infrastructure, democracies, freedoms, 
knowledge, arts, etc.) made available to businesses and residents of each country,  it is good to 
consider technology and also the external opening and facilitation of business by the State 
(infrastructure and productive investments, reliable justice, education and research) which 
determine development, that is to say the subsistence economy, the commercial 
economy, the emerging market, and finally the economy based on technology. International 
organizations such as AFDB, OCED and UNDP (2017, p.120) indicate that " … when 
combined with accelerated urbanization, the very large increase in the working age population 
can lead to industrialization "; and indicates that "Only industrialization can create the 
conditions for an unconditional convergence of the African continent with the most advanced 
economies ".   For Fukunishi (2004, p. 1) the success of Asian countries has shown that 
intensive labor-industries can lead to economic growth in the early stages 
of economic development, through the use of a docile and worker with relatively low labor 
costs.  
Indeed, manufactured products always have upstream and downstream links with other sectors 
that can generate positive benefits for the economy as a whole. However, as Maliactu (2016) 
shows, the SMIG of Burkina Faso, like that of its neighbors, Niger or Mali, is less than € 50 
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per month. It is therefore an opportunity for development.  The main question is: Why are 
companies importing products rather than focusing on local material transformation? 
The main objective is to examine if the Global Value Chains (GVC) contribute to the creation 
of added value in developing countries.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Value Chains and the Development of Added Value   
The value chain is a concept created by Michael Porter in 1980 whose systematic approach 
aims to examine the development of competitive advantages. The chain consists of a series of 
activities that add value. They result in the total value provided by a company. Porter 
(1991) has been the first to popularize the Chains of Global Value (GVC) with the term 
"Global Value Chains" (GVC) by studying the value added at country level and the 
competitiveness between them through their businesses. Although the role of countries in this 
competition is becoming more and more passive, because the transport revolution and 
relocation imply a multiple interlocking of different production and service 
activities worldwide.     
  
Organization of Value Chains. 
 To understand the Global Value Chains, Gereffi and Fernandez Stark (2011) simplify it by 
using a diagram, as in the example follows: 
  
  
Figure 1:  Segment of the Global Value Chain for Fruit and Vegetables 
Source: Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) 
  
It must however be taken into account that the different segments of this chain contain a great 
diversity of activities and economic operators, close or geographically distant, and with very 
different negotiation forces, as it is shown below:   
 
 
Figure 2: Components of the Segments of the Global Value Chain 
Source: Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) 
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Kaplinsky and Morris (2002) explain that there are two different types of GVC. The first 
consists of the so-called “vertical specialization” chains, in which the different components can 
be produced in parallel, the cost of transport is relatively low and the intermediate products 
are not degraded. For example, Jeans. The second type is made up of so-called “additive” value 
chains in which the various stages of production are necessarily sequenced, the cost of transport 
is relatively high and the intermediate products can deteriorate. These value chains mainly 
concern the natural resources sector (agriculture, minerals and metals, energy). 
Baldwin and Venables (2010) analyze and characterize in turn the organization of GVCs: for 
them, there are snakes and spiders. The snakes are the processes whose steps must follow a 
logical or scientific, and spiders imply the assembly of parts in no particular order. 
Value chains often have a geographic distribution that takes into account the specific 
advantages of each country:  
- climate and hand labor cheap for production agricultural;          
- cheap skilled labor and good logistics for processing;       
- technology and purchasing power for finishing and release for consumption.          
 This is what one can see in the following diagram:  
 
 
Figure 3: African Cashew (Cashew) Value Chain 
Source: Adaptation  from Ricau (2013) * for 95% of the Cashew Production 
from Africa 
  
The globalization of chains value has indeed caused an international division of labor in which 
the functions creating the most value (design, R & D, branding, marketing, logistics, financial 
services ...) have focused in leaders companies to file located in developed countries, while a 
number of countries to revenue means (China, India, Mexico) have been able to 
create manufacturing companies (and industries and services to provide) can produce much 
and cheaper. However, the reduction in transport costs and the ease of controlling activities 
over the Internet have led to an increasingly significant fragmentation of the production 
process, which prompted Krugman (1995) to use some terms like " slicing the value chain " 
this is to say that the international decomposition of the chain value is one of the most 
important facts of the current global trade.    
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Advances in Development through Value Chains. 
It is possible for a country to obtain a greater share of the value added of a chain of global value 
if it is able to achieve a qualitative leap in the activities it performs. Its companies can go from 
the simple production of agricultural products, to their first transformation, to the realization 
of international logistics operations or to distribution on foreign markets. This qualitative 
leap (" upgrading " in English) is defined by Gereffi (2005, p. 171) "the process by which 
economic actors - companies and workers - pass from activities of low value to others relatively 
high in GVC ".  Kaplinsky and Morris (2002, p. 38) define 4 different kinds of qualitative leaps, 
which they classify hierarchically from the least important to the most important:    
- the qualitative leap in process: improving the production process, for example with less 
waste, with more targeted distribution and without delivery delays…            
- the qualitative leap in product: the improvement of the company's old products or the 
introduction of new ones, with of course new production processes for these new 
products…            
- the functional qualitative leap: the increase in added value linked to the development of 
new functions in the value chain, such as design, and the subcontracting of 
others.            
- the qualitative leap in the chain: the wise step towards a new, more remunerative value 
chain, for example moving from manufacturing radios to TVs, or calculators to 
computers.            
 In other words, this development involves the incorporation of activities upstream (from the 
control of inputs) and downstream (until purchase by the end consumer). This is what certain 
countries, particularly Asian ones, have managed to do while others have remained at less 
advanced stages. Below is an example from the fruit and vegetable sector (See Figure 4 below). 
  
 
Figure 4: Different Stages of Activities Development  
Source: Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) 
  
From the data of Ricau (2013) as presented on Figure 5 the added value of each segment of 
the value chain of Cashew Nuts (Cashew). 
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Figure 5: African Cashew Nuts (Cashew) Value Chain and its Added Value for Each Segment 
Source: Adapted from Ricau (2013) as for the Previous Figure. 
  
Africa that abounds in raw materials, should try to go upmarket as for example did a mining 
supplier in Chile: by passing from simple merchant importer to service provider then to 
manufacturer, designer of mining drilling equipment and exporter of most of its production  
In the following graph, the authors associate the increase in value added with that of the 
technology incorporated in sales and the level of competitiveness with the share of exports in 
turnover. 
 
Figure 6: Upmarket in a GVC by Industrialization. 
Source: Free Adaptation from Farole and Winkler (2014).  
  
Development in Practice in the Context of Burkina Faso 
With an annual population growth rate of 3% and an average of 6 children per woman, 
Burkina Faso (like the other countries of Sahel) shows an uncontrolled increase in population, 
which constantly limits the benefits of growth economic (with recurrent stagnation in GDP per 
capita) all the more so since the establishment of transport, health and 
education infrastructure has not kept pace. 
The PNDES (2017, p.19) considers that "the current demographic dynamic in Burkina Faso 
does not present opportunities for the economy to take advantage of the demographic 
dividend".  The gold boom in Burkina Faso has almost no induced effects on the growth of 
other sectors in Burkina Faso, and owes its strength to the crisis in the world economy, 
especially since the costs of extracting this ore there are comparatively higher than in many 
other countries. This situation masks the problem of the overall viability of the country which, 
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without this windfall, would have entered what Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) define as a 
poverty trap, which applies to "non-viable" countries without the indefinite permanence of 
development aid in its many forms. It should be remembered that Burkina Faso had already 
been considered "unsustainable" in 1932 and carved up by France in 3 regions annexed to each 
of the neighboring colonies (Mali, Ivory Coast and Niger) until the beginning of the cold war. 
Always due to colonization, the organization of trade was done by force for the benefit of 
European cities which exported manufactured products to the least developed regions of the 
world, against the importation of cheap primary products. Even today, according to 
the Economist of Faso (2016) 60% of Burkina Faso's exports go to Europe, while there is only 
16% to Africa. 
 
Figure 7: African Exports of Intermediate Products by Main Sector and Destination 
                           Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2015, p. 112)  
 
As it can be seen on the previous graph, trade is increasing in Africa and the rest of the world, 
but the proportions and directions are still unchanged today. When African countries embarked 
on industrialization policies after independence, they found themselves faced with 
management problems for which they had neither qualified personnel nor accumulated 
experience. And as Krueger (1974) indicates, many abuses of power have taken place leading 
to unproductive activities and to reversals which have plagued many companies, due to the low 
weight of civil society, institutions and justice. This is why industrial policy is considered 
by Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett (2015) having a speed effect on growth, but most 
countries, especially those who most need growth, lack the means to implement it. Regnier 
(2007) explains how the economic success of the 4 Dragons has spilled over into an Asian 
model of development, based on the massive export of manufactured goods at low prices. 
Which makes Porter (1991) say that “ All exports from less developed countries tend to be 
linked to (low) factor costs and price competition… without a strategy that has beyond these 
advantages, the countries in this situation will face a constant threat of losing their competitive 
position ". This can even lead to an impoverishing growth, such as Bangladesh and the 
Dominican Republic whose competition within the GVC as subcontractors manufacturing is 
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based on the wage offer cheaper each time. However, in the smallest and least developed 
countries, the local actors targeted by the GVC leaders, as Dunning and Lundan (2008, p. 
607) explain, are short of knowledge and economic resources. This prevents them from going 
up in rank.  
However, it is difficult to generate the professional skills necessary to take advantage of GVCs 
while the less advanced countries of Sub-Saharan Africa face worrying demographic 
challenges including that of training (for example in Burkina Faso according to INSD 
(2017): the literacy rate of adults aged 15 and over in 2014 was estimated at 34.5% and the 
success rate at BEPC was 29% in 2016).   
At the same time, changes in the distribution of going their added within many chain 's value 
is to reduce the value added in producing and performing a first processing and its rise in the 
country consumers. Table 1 shows the data on the evolution of the added value of a basket of 
12 food products collected by Willoughby and Gore (2018): Avocados (Peru), bananas 
(Ecuador), canned tuna (Thailand), cocoa (Ivory Coast), coffee (Colombia), grapes (South 
Africa), green beans (Kenya), juice 'orange (Brazil), rice (Thailand), shrimp (Vietnam), tea 
(India), tomatoes (Morocco) .  
 
Table 1 
Data on the Evolution of the Added Value of a Basket of 12 Food Products 
  1996-1998 2015 
Cost of inputs 3.9% 6.7% 
Production and logistics 52.5% 45.0% 
Supermarkets 43.5% 48.3% 
  Source: Elaboration Using Data from Willoughby and Gore (2018) 
 
 Which gives us the following graph:  
  
 
Figure 8: Evolution of the Sharing of Added Value in 12 Global Food Value Chains 
Source: Elaboration Using Data from Willoughby and Gore (2018) 
 
This phenomenon is generalized, with more serious cases than the others. Ambrosus 
Technologies Gmbh (2018), citing Fairtrade International, reports that global coffee revenues 
increased from $ 30 billion to $ 81 billion from 1991 to 2016, while those of coffee producers 
divided by 4 during the same period. 
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 It affects most value chains, since the share of added value that goes to production and logistics 
companies has also decreased in manufacturing companies. Indeed, Economie Matin (2014) 
explains that in the textile and clothing market, the distribution of added value is 45% for the 
retailer, 40% for the brand, 5% for logistics, and 10% for production (have wages 1.5 to 
3%). It is dominated by 4 multinationals: Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), Inditex, Gap Inc. and 
Fast Retailing. This is why many GVCs are at high risk of dependence, that is to say that the 
main buyer in the chain takes more than 35% of production. This dependence manifests itself 
in the acceptance of suffering losses to remain active in GVC, as it can be seen on the following 
table 2:  
 
Table 2: 
Global Value Chain (GVC) Suppliers in 2015 
GVC suppliers  All sectors 
combined 
Textile sector 
Often accept prices below their production costs. 39% 52% 
Main reason for selling at a loss : trying to secure future orders  77% 81% 
High risk of dependence (the main buyer in the GVC takes more 
than 35% of the production) * 
54% 75% 
                         Source: Vaughan-Whitehead and Pinedo(2017)  
  
The strength of leading companies in GVCs is often based on unfair commercial practices 
(PCD) detailed by the European Commission (2018):  
- order cancellations at very short notice;             
- unilateral and retroactive modification of the terms of the supply contract; 
- the obligation made to suppliers by buyers to pay for their unsold goods, storage, exhibition, 
referencing or promotion of products. 
We have noticed an increasingly unequal distribution of added value in GVCs, to the benefit 
of leading companies which are able to impose very harsh conditions on all those who want to 
participate. Ajmal and al. (2015) note that it is the very structure of GVCs, with a multitude of 
potential suppliers around the world that makes it easy to change them while facing very low 
costs to do so. And it is quite possible that new technologies (which are available mainly to 
leading companies) reinforce this trend towards the concentration of added value by enabling 
new savings to be made throughout GVCs. So, Wilson and Auchard (2018) inform that 
Carrefour has implemented a blockchain system (defined by Balva, 2018). CAS storage 
technology and transmission of cryptographic related information developed by IBM to 
increase the traceability of the origin of all its fresh food products and quickly identify the 
responsibilities (company and supplier country) in the event of detection of quality 
problems. Yeretzian (2016) explains that the blockchain brings to the attention of all users (in 
this case partners, suppliers and actors involved in the value chain) the prices charged at each 
level, the qualities and volumes committed and the progress of the process for each 
order. Blockchain is therefore a tool to reduce the costs and disputes related to the delivery of 
goods, corruption and fraud, but also it removes intermediaries on the basis of mutual trust 
between producers and consumers. It is the whole relational fabric of African society that will 
be called into question. 
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Paradoxes or Working Assumption 
Farcis (2006) reports on the words of the director of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
program of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Habib 
Ouane : “The market sector in LDCs is characterized by the juxtaposition of micro-enterprises, 
which do not create jobs and do not absorb foreign technologies and subsidiaries of large 
foreign companies, in small numbers ”. The missing link preventing the replication of the 
development parameters tried with success elsewhere could be a dense network 
of formal small and medium-sized enterprises, capable of importing and locally 
adapting technologies to produce goods and services with high added value, and 
create sustainable jobs.   
 Fukunishi (2004, p. 13) indicates that the ability to improve the competitiveness of the factors 
of production is beyond the reach of governments in the short term. And that in the absence of 
studies measuring the factors of production, the reality of sub-Saharan African economies 
cannot be explained by the different economic theories, but rather by the imperfections of these 
markets.  
Kerrazi (2015, p. 2) explains that in Africa, the integration of countries in GVCs is high, but 
it is almost not accompanied by creation of added value for the economies of these 
countries. Farole and Winkler (2014, p. 259) indeed point out that if GVCs offer wider 
possibilities for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), they actually pose new, often 
insurmountable barriers for the local creation of added value. This is due to the quality 
standards (or technological level) of companies that have materialized FDI which limit their 
collaboration with local companies. 
 In line with these observations, we are witnessing in Burkina Faso a manufacturing 
deindustrialization linked to the decrease in the local added value of these activities, as 
confirmed by the PNDES (2017, p. 11) "The marked drop in the contribution of modern 
manufacturing industries other that cotton ginning goes from 13.9% over the 1986-1990 period 
to 1.2% over the 2011-2015 period". These figures for sectoral contribution to GDP are 
very close to those based on the turnover of the country's main companies, given by the 
"Maison de l'Entreprise" (2016), but what is particularly shocking is the comparison between 
exportable manufactured products and the import of finished products manufactured 
abroad which represents almost 40% of their turnover, as indicated on Table 3 below, based on 
the tax returns of large companies at the end of 2013:    
 
Table 3 
Activity and Turnover of the 500 Largest Companies in Burkina Faso (2013)  
Business activity of Burkina Faso % of turnover of 500+ large companies 
Processing of partly exported local 
products (cotton ginning not considered). 
1.32% 
Processing of imported products 6.31% 
Export of raw local products 21.28% 
Import of finished products 38.08% 
Source: Néré File from the ‘Maison de l'Entreprise’ of Burkina Faso (2016) 
  
It is true that turnover is not an indicator of the profitability of a company, but the craze for an 
activity is one. What is even more symptomatic is to check in the directory produced by the 
Maison de l'Entreprise (2016) that among the top 30 companies in Burkina Faso in terms of 
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turnover (60% of turnover of the 500 most important companies of the country, that is more 
than 3000 billion FCFA) we do not find any manufacturing company (public monopoly of 
ginning of cotton excluded). 
 
Theory of Disruptive Innovation    
The theory of disruptive innnovation is opposed to the theory of sustaining innovation. With a 
world that is becoming highly competitive (Nasse, 2019; Nasse and Sawadogo, 2019; Nasse, 
2015), innovation is a must for the survival of some companies and organizations. The origin 
of this theory is to be found in the works of Clayton Christensen in the 1990s. The researchers 
that defend this theory find that the way of driving innovation should be a driving force that 
increase the overall performance of the companies and thus, it should be an additive value for 
the companies as well as a competitive advantage (Porter, 1996) to make a difference with the 
competition (Christensen, 1997; Christensen, 2003; Alshenqeeti, and Inderawati, 2020). 
Disruptive innovation is more practiced by ‘entrants’ rather than ‘incumbents’ as its focus is 
smaller segments and because the margin of profit is small (Christensen et al., 2018). However, 
innovation alone cannot explain the competitiveness of a given company or organisation. 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
This is a qualitative research based on a constructivist epistemological posture. According to 
Nasse (2018) qualitative approach allows the researcher to gain more information on the 
fieldwork. 
Context: The research is carried in Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso. The city of 
Ouagadougou has a lot of number of companies and managers. The sectors of activities are 
also numerous. 
Research Procedures and Sample Size 
Among the companies for which the author has worked as a consultant, are analyzed and 
compared, ranging from informal to large limited companies or anonymous, roughly all 
of medium and large enterprises in terms of sales. Their apparent success was measured by two 
factors: the sales growth of business and the increase in staff over 3 consecutive years but not 
necessarily the same in 2010-2016. Indeed, all the consultations did not take place at the same 
time, but rather successively within the range. The companies were compared using 
management ratios (liquidity, solvency, export propensity, productivity and profitability, 
broken down in the latter case using the Dupont method). Given that this is confidential 
information, the commercial names of the companies are not revealed, but designated in an 
alphanumeric manner.  Individual interviews with the managers of these companies were 
carried out in order to identify critical factors to their success. They were then grouped together 
to obtain the following list of 12 critical success factors for businesses in Africa:      
- recruitment procedures 
- staff motivation 
- organizational skills 
- management style 
- product quality and commercial competitiveness 
- relational capital 
- practical management 
- modern management 
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- strategic positioning 
- choosing the most profitable activity 
- tool performance (including control of production and distribution costs) 
- the entrepreneur's vision 
 The importance of each critical success factor was determined with an indicative score of 0 to 
10 each, but also of its components or indicators. After a first failure in 2014, linked to the fact 
of asking open-ended questions, this research gave rise to a questionnaire of 45 
questions grouping in the form of statements to validate or deny sentences relating to each of 
the components of the factors of success, plus questions characterizing the respondents (age, 
sector, turnover, level of education, gender, nationality, etc.). The questionnaire was carried 
out with the participation of 258 managers and owners of exclusively African businesses who 
came to participate in the Africallia shows of 2016 and 2018, in Ouagadougou.     
Primary Data Collection 
The question analyzed in this article is based on the 2018 survey, which expresses 129 valid 
results provided by owner managers (70%) or simple managers of businesses, all of them 
exclusively African , who mainly came to seek technical partners during their participation in 
Africallia with, among the interviewees, 95% of companies formally registered, 68% of people 
having followed university studies, 82% of businessmen and women of Burkina Faso 
nationality and 18% coming from other African countries, 83 % of men and 17% of women, 
with ages overwhelmingly between 28 and 52 (for 86% of the responses). 
Secondary Data Gathering 
Secondary data were used to supplement the primary data. The secondary data is from several 
sources such as documents and research papers that are cited here. This data is analyzed for 
the purpose of the present research. 
Ethical Considerations 
In this process, certain sensitive data related to companies cannot be made public because of 
their confidential nature.    
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In surveys conducted in 129 of Burkina Faso businessmen (during Forum Africallia 2016) 
they stated that the most profitable economic sectors and less risky s are in the following 
order:                                                                                                 
1. Import companies of finished products        
2. Export companies of raw products 
       3. Companies importing products to be processed locally 
       4. Export companies of processed local products 
 This same field study confirmed (by crossing the responses of businessmen surveyed on their 
turnover and their sector of activity) that it is trade and services activities that are both the 
most numerous and those that make it possible to achieve larger turnover, followed by 
construction, agribusiness and lastly, industry, as shown in the following graph :  
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Figure 9: Attraction and Business by Sector of Activity 
Source: Field Study, 2018 
  
The fact that businessmen see no profitability in processing local products and then exporting 
them while trying to keep most of the added value of the final product in the country is due to 
the characteristics of these products, such as we will see later, but also to the fact that it is an 
activity with many risks, while there are others such as the import of finished products or the 
export of raw products which allow to obtain better profitability without having to face almost 
any risk. The accounts of the following companies studied (Burkina Faso, Togo and Ivory 
Coast) shed a little more light on the reason for these opinions. Starting with the 8 companies 
initially analyzed, 2 whose main activity is construction were excluded because they are neither 
importers nor exporters. Below is a summary on Table 4:  
 
Table 4 
Comparison of West African Business Results in 2014  
 Business Type Country Sales * Business Value * Added VA / / 
CA 
Net 
income * 
Staff 
figures 
Balance sheet 
assets * 
Main Products Position in 
GVC 
Import 1 LTD BF 30248 2290 8% 431 825 28243 Sheets and irons Intermediate 
Import 2 LTD BF 4563 557 12.2% 458 150 1211 Frozen fish Almost final 
Import 3 LTD CI 4000 316 8% 299 12 592 hydrocarbons Almost final 
Export 1 LTD BF 920 155 17% -196 400 753 Cashew 
almonds 
Intermediate 
Export 2 INF BF 91 11 12% -0.1 485 100 Dried mango Intermediate 
Export 3 INF TO 64 -6 -9.4% -12 45 35 Dried pineapple Intermediate 
Source: Fieldwork (2016) 
NB: * Millions of FCFA 
 
Import companies 1 and 2 and export companies 1 and 2 belong to Burkina Faso; and export 
company 3 belongs to Togo,  and import  company 3 to Ivory Coast, in order to verify if the 
situation in Burkina Faso is the same as the situation in other west African countries. SA stands 
for ‘Société Anonyme’ which means a Limited Company’ and INF an ‘informal individual 
enterprise’. The columns of Turnover, Added Value, VA / CA (Added Value divided by 
Turnover) and Net Result are in millions of FCFA. Export 1, 2 and 3 belong to the food 
processing sector, while import 1 belongs to heavy metallurgy, import 2 to the distribution of 
hydrocarbons and import 3 to that of food products. One can observe that despite the number 
of workers in the processing companies e t export, the fixed asset s are low, which may 
be correlated with low productivity and absolute values of relatively low turnover. Importing 
companies often have lower value added percentages on turnover than those of the best 
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performing exporting companies, however, these show structural cost problems which lead 
them to abnormally low profits. We observe here that the size of the assets of processing and 
export companies is much smaller than that of companies importing finished or intermediate 
products, which has consequences for economies of scale, productivity and the breakdown of 
added value until you get the profits. 
All these figures are taken from official accounts, and it is easy to assume that they do not 
completely reflect the reality of the companies concerned because tax evasion is very strong in 
Africa, as Ndikumana (2017) notes. However, if cheating takes place in all businesses, it 
mainly concerns the cover-up of revenues so as not to have to pay too much income tax. On 
the other hand, these cheats rarely concern the assets of companies, because there is almost no 
tax advantage to do so. As for importing companies, the highest returns on assets belong to 
those which import finished products, compared to that which imports products for their further 
processing and sale on the local market. 
Other more refined observations lead us to the same conclusions: even in the cases where the 
most industrial exporting companies have high added value, the profitability of their assets in 
terms of production of added value is poor, and the productivity of the staff employed is 
lower. This implies a lower return on investment, problems with higher personnel (not 
counting the tax uncertainty because the profit is less related to amounts paid to customs, so 
most likely a severe adjustment). In addition, as indicated by Nasse (2019) the insane 
practices and discrimination in the relationship with customers lead to the reduction of 
profitability. In the same context Zongo and Nasse (2019) have shown that reliability and 
responsiveness are also some key factors that influence customers’ satisfaction. 
According to the International Trade Center online database (2018), Burkina Faso's export 
potential consists of a basket of 20 products including 14 raw materials with almost no 
processing (including gold or sesame) and 7 products with very relative added value. These 
are:   
- dried mangoes,          
- cashew almonds,          
- peeled or roasted peanuts,         
- oil cakes, shea butters and vegetable oils of cotton seed          
- bronze sculptures          
- raw beef or pig skins          
- concrete iron and sheets          
The only truly industrial product with the creation of local added value and exported is concrete 
iron and sheet metal, and this, for a volume of 2 or 3% of national production, and exclusively 
for Niger, even less supplied only Burkina in metallurgical enterprises. These are few in 
number and mainly supply the construction and trade sectors, which are very fragmented, 
which gives them a major advantage allowing them to operate as an oligopoly and capture a 
large part of the added value of the metal products used in construction. Buyers of oils, butters 
and cakes produced in Burkina do not want this country to develop more advanced processing 
industries for these goods because one of their main attractants is that they are 
“natural” products. Similarly, dried mangoes and cashew almonds are often “organic” because 
producers cannot afford to buy pesticides or herbicides. Peanuts are only transformed into 
paste (and in artisanal conditions) to serve the local market. The slaughterhouses that serve 
local butchers separate the skins for export, but there is no efficient facility for the export of 
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frozen meat. The meat is exported to the border and the railway is not even used to quickly 
bring the animals to Abidjan, the main market in Côte d'Ivoire. Finally, cashew almonds or 
dried mangoes are not an end product in the consumption and processing chain, and prices are 
decided by a handful (small intermediaries having been absorbed or declared bankrupt) of 
multinationals that make it world trade and the game of speculation on the stock 
markets. So the most industrial activities related to export are so poorly developed in 
their different value chain of hatred they generate almost no added value in the Burkina 
Faso.     
According to Biggs and Srivastava (1996, p. 54) African firms show lower total factor 
productivity levels than firms in other developing countries. This is due to the fact that any 
cheaper costs of African labor are offset by lower labor productivity and by lower productivity 
of all other factors, i.e. a whole series of structural constraints which lead to higher production 
costs:  
- poor financing, especially for exports; 
- bad public industrial policies; 
- a low technological level with an absence of innovations; 
- poor telecommunications, energy, road, and port infrastructure (with costs 600% higher than 
in Asia in the latter case); 
- high transaction costs, without legal guarantees or information on the local market and a high 
cost of access to external markets, complicate collaboration between companies. 
Akouwerabou (2014, p. 214) shows that corruption is widespread (153 companies out of a 
sample of 282 having obtained public contracts in 2012 in Burkina Faso) in many African 
countries and affirms that this scourge deviates important resources of some companies for 
obtaining market in this way, instead of investing in the improvement of competitiveness, and 
this is one of the reasons of SMEs’ inefficiency.   
Given that Burkina Faso is an underdeveloped landlocked country surrounded by 
underdeveloped countries (Nasse, 2012) who all suffer from similar structural constraints, the 
cost of the industrial production for export are even worse, especially since the international 
markets are very competitive. 
This is why Kerrazi (2015, p. 19) gives three main causes to explain why the creation of added 
value through the Global Value Chains is a failure in Africa:   
• specialization in activities that are less strategic and therefore less value-creating; 
• difficulties in moving upmarket in the Global Value Chains; 
• and a limited capacity for innovation, as one can also see it on the following Figure 10.  
 On this last point, the words of Kabou (1991, p. 25) are still topical. "Africa which ... claims 
... a better distribution of the benefits of scientific progress made in the world, is distinguished 
in it by a sovereign contempt for creativity, the dissemination of technical knowledge, by a 
terrifying lack of imagination and a murderous conformism”. This is why the argument which 
claims that Africa will benefit from integrating directly into global value chains, forgets that it 
is precisely the effort of having had to overcome one by one all the development stages that 
has prepared some countries to overcome new technological challenges and globalization. 
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Figure 10: Innovation in Different Areas of the World and Africa 
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization Statistics Database 
 
CONCLUSION 
With a human development index listed 185th out of 188 countries by Jahan (2016), Burkina 
Faso is struggling to get out of poverty and to be a developed country. Here the recipe proposes 
to increase local manufacturing production to increase the share of value-added paid in the 
chain of global value per hour to create jobs and wealth. The competitive advantage of Burkina 
Faso relies on the low price of its labor, its market opportunities (Nasse et al., 2019; Kiékiéta, 
and  Nassè, 2020), and a limited number of manufacturing companies, its banks, monopolies, 
fuel distributors or mining companies. It has also been noticed that Burkina 
Faso hardly incorporates added value in its exported productions. While development 
aid should head in priority to the development of productive infrastructure, it is very 
largely diverted from its purpose and becomes as indicated Keza (2005) a fund redistribution 
tool that stimulates consumption and imports. This is where the added 
value appears in the most downstream of Global Value Chains, and in the implementation 
of trade and distribution networks to sell products that create jobs and wealth somewhere else. 
Africa is a rich land in economic paradoxes. The resource curse and the paradox of abundance 
are already mentioned by the African Development Bank (2007). Farcis (2006) already spoke 
of growth without development for poor countries. This article shows that it is possible in these 
same countries to have some added value creation without industrialization; as well as the 
integration of African countries in GVCs without creating some added value. According to 
Schumpeter (1935) the entrepreneur is the central actor of development and therefore if 
creating industrial added value for the development of a country is not profitable for its 
businessmen, the country will never develop. 
Other similar lines of research could develop several other correlative paradoxes that could 
take place in Burkina Faso, such as for example: the demographic explosion without 
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demographic dividend, the formalization of companies without jobs’ creation, or the very 
strong growth of banks without increasing the credit margin for businesses. 
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